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Abstract—Framing Internet of Things (IoT) applications as a
System of Systems (SoS) can help us make sense of complexity
associated with interoperability and emergence. However, assess-
ing the risk of SoSs is a challenge due to the independence
of component systems, and their differing degrees of control
and emergence. This paper presents three components for SoS
risk assessment that integrate with existing risk assessment
approaches: Human System Integration (HSI), Interoperability
identification and analysis, and Emergent behaviour evaluation
and control measures. We demonstrate the application of these
components by assessing a pervasive SoS: a SmartPowerchair.
Index Terms—System of Systems, System of Systems Engi-
neering, Security, Risk Assessment, Human System Integration,
Interoperability, Emergence, Pervasive Technologies, Assistive
Technologies, Internet of Things.
I. INTRODUCTION
To build an Internet of Things (IoT) application, one
needs to select and integrate multiple hardware and software
components. This includes, sensors, communications modules,
and networks, integrated with core systems while applying
changes to process and people interaction with technology
[1]. For example, smart city sensors monitoring air quality
or traffic. However, interoperability and emergence are such
intrinsic properties of IoT applications that the classic notion
of a system is inadequate for dealing with system complexity,
and tackling security problems. In recent years, there has
been some interest in framing IoT systems as Systems-of-
systems [2]. A System of Systems (SoS) is an integration
of independent and operable constituent systems, networked
together to achieve a higher goal [3]. While the notion of
SoS can help manage design complexity, there is little work
providing guidance for what designing for SoS security entails.
Moreover, although some literature exists considering SoS
challenges to risk management, there has been little work
focusing on risk assessment and security in SoSs.
Risk, the effect of uncertainty on objectives [4], is a key
concept in security requirements engineering. Requirements
specified need to reflect a system’s expected behaviour in
the presence of risk. These requirements need to be verified
and validated to ensure specified behaviour is in line with
stakeholder expectations. Unfortunately, risk assessment can
be a challenge in a SoS, where operational and managerial
independence exists, with differing degrees of centralised
control, and constraints on geographical, environmental, evo-
lutionary, and emergent behaviour adding to SoS complexities.
Human interaction and culture can also create obstacles to, or
opportunities for interoperability [5].
To understand the interplay between risk assessment and
socio-technical SoSs, this paper presents SoS centred com-
ponents for risk assessment. These are evaluated in a se-
curity context, the output of which is intended to inform
requirements engineering through to operations. We evaluate
these components by considering security risks to an assistive
technology SmartPowerchair pervasive SoS case study. This
was elicited and modelled using the Computer Aided Integra-
tion of Requirements and Information Security (CAIRIS) tool
[6]. CAIRIS can assist when modelling the socio-technical
interaction of the SoS and provides a current view on risks
and associated assets, roles, goals, tasks, and other security
and usability concepts. The SmartPowerchair is a standard
powered wheelchair (Powerchair) integrated with existing per-
vasive technologies. This is comprised of different systems,
components, interactions and functions [7] [8], with the aim
of enabling independent living, improving quality of life for
people with reduced physical abilities.
We introduce the SoS concept in Section II and provide
an overview of risk assessment in Section III, presenting our
proposed SoS components for risk assessment in Section IV.
We then apply our approach to the SmartPowerchair case
study in Section V, and conclude by discussing findings and
implications from our approach and detail directions for future
work in Sections VI and VII respectively.
II. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS CONCEPT
Systems Engineering has undergone major changes to ex-
tend itself beyond a single system framework towards a class
of complex systems whose constituents are themselves com-
plex [3]. A SoS is the concept of the coming together of these
complex systems to collectively obtain higher capabilities and
performance. The emerging field of System of Systems En-
gineering (SoSE) requires continued growth in understanding
of the discipline [9]. Capability suppliers must integrate many
new technical and organisational systems with older legacy
systems, within and beyond their own organisational boundary
[10].
A SoS exists when there is a majority presence of five
characteristics: operational independence, managerial indepen-
dence, geographic distribution, evolutionary development, and
emergent behaviour [11] from combined system interactions
in ways not intended by the original single system designers.
This means actions cannot be predicted through analysis at any
level other than the SoS as a whole [12]. An important element
of SoS is Interoperability: the ability of two or more systems
or elements to use and exchange information [13]. Given the
SoS has a dependency on interoperable systems to fulfil its SoS
mission goals, this challenge needs to be addressed early in the
development life-cycle considering the scale, complexity and
integration challenges, and must be monitored and assessed at
an operational level.
As described by [5], a SoS can generally be categorised as
one of four types:
Directed SoSs: These are built and managed to fulfil specific
purposes; they are centrally managed during long-term oper-
ation to continue to fulfil and evolve those purposes. Compo-
nent systems maintain an ability to operate independently, but
their normal operational mode is subordinated to the central
managed purpose [11].
Acknowledged SoSs: These have recognised objectives, a
designated manager, and resources for the SoS, but con-
stituent systems retain their independent ownership, objectives,
funding, as well as development and sustainment approaches.
Changes to systems are based on collaboration between the
SoS and systems [9].
Collaborative SoSs: These are distinct from Directed SoSs
in that the central management organisation does not have
coercive power to run the system. The component systems
must, more or less, voluntarily collaborate to fulfil the agreed
upon central purposes [11].
Virtual SoSs: These lack both central management authority
and centrally agreed upon purposes, may exist deliberately or
accidentally, and large-scale behaviour emerges, which may be
desirable [11]. Participants informally collaborate and manage
their own systems to maintain the system as a whole [14].
All SoSs are collaborative in different ways. An important
aspect for operations and engineering is to understand and
identify characteristics at a system-element level [15], and
the relationship and concurrent behaviour amongst systems
to understand the SoS as a whole. This is easier in Directed
SoSs, but the challenge becomes greater as central manage-
ment, access and control of constituent systems is reduced in
Acknowledged, Collaborative and Virtual SoSs. Consequently,
classic approaches for security, risk assessment, human factors,
requirements and systems engineering need to evolve to cope
with challenges posed by different SoS characteristics [10]
[16].
III. RISK ASSESSMENT
The goal of any risk assessment is to determine whether a
system is acceptable and which measures would provide its
acceptability [17]. Risk can be calculated using the formula:
Level of Risk (R) = Risk Likelihood (L) × Risk Impact (I).
This is a widely recognised approach applied in a number of
risk assessment frameworks, methodologies and standards.
Managing risk in a SoS depends on its type and com-
plexity, and considers a range of risk-based contexts includ-
ing business, project, technical, safety and security risk. An
organisational based SoS is likely to be governed by legal
or regulatory requirements meeting certain standards through
policy and procedures. An IoT as a SoS may, however, be
managed and operated at a single user level integrating with
other systems. This places a greater reliance on requirements
engineering to reduce system and SoS risk. As a result, the
SoS would benefit from consistent approaches to risk from
requirements to operations when addressing the SoS mission
needs and goals.
Attending to risk in an engineering context might draw
ideas from Systems [18] [19] and SoS [20] engineering guides,
security and requirements engineering approaches [21] [22] or
a range of other context-specific engineering and operational
approaches. At a basic organisational level, Cyber Essentials
[23] may be considered, whereas at a higher level of security
standards for controls, the most common are the Generally
Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information
Technology Systems [24], and from the ISO 27001+ [25] and
NIST Special Publication 800 [26] families, with supporting
risk management approaches [27] [4] [28]. Other methodolo-
gies such as ISRAM [29] or Octave [30] [31] may also be
integrated. Working with this myriad of approaches becomes a
challenge where different systems or stages of the development
life-cycle use differing approaches to achieve the same goal.
Some of these are focused on a single system or organisation
context, and scale poorly given SoS collaboration complexity
Despite various definitions and sub-steps associated with
risk management, the literature concedes that risk assessment
entails three key processes:
• Risk Identification develops an in-depth understanding
of the system structure and assets. To identify the risks
present within the SoS environment, it then identifies
threat-sources and vulnerable system elements, controls
and potential consequences.
• Risk Analysis determines the likelihood and severity of
consequences from identified risks impacting on the sys-
tem element, individual systems and SoS.
• Risk Evaluation considers the risk criteria and context,
controls and regulatory requirements to make risk-based
decisions for future operation. High or unacceptable risks
identified are prioritised with potential risk reduction
controls considered ahead of risk treatment [4].
Before any risk assessment begins, the context of use,
mission goals, boundaries, relevant stakeholders, scope, and
risk criteria should be considered.
IV. SOS COMPONENTS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT
During each of the aforementioned three processes, key
SoS components critical to SoS success should be considered.
Given the socio-technical nature of a SoS and pervasive
technologies, close attention should be paid to human profiles
and their relationship with the SoS. Interoperability across
different SoS types, constituent systems and components can
also impact aspects of the system influencing risk analysis.
Given the unpredictable nature of emergence, it is difficult
to capture risks centred on emergent behaviour of SoSs
using existing risk assessment approaches. Consequently, we
propose considering three components to assist in SoS risk
assessment that overlay through identification, analysis and
evaluation steps, and have the potential to be utilised alongside
existing security and risk approaches, e.g. ISO 27005 [4].
A. Human System Integration Analysis
The first component entails analysing human characteristics
involved within the SoS. Human System Integration (HSI)
analysis focuses on roles, responsibilities and relationships of
manpower and personnel, ownership, stakeholder interaction,
training, safety and other factors [32]. HSI is completed at
an operational level, or included in requirements engineering
and throughout the development life-cycle into operations. Its
output and considerations can inform socio-technical aspects
that we apply towards security and risk. Engineers or risk
managers may adopt a user-centred approach, assisting HSI
considerations towards risk identification and analysis, while
incorporating evaluation and controls suitable to the SoS and
its users. During this stage, we also introduce abstraction
stacks [15] for system decomposition, and tool support [33]
for eliciting and modelling the SoS.
B. Interoperability Analysis
The second component considers the interoperability impact
within the SoS using a qualitative assessment based upon
the expertise of system engineers or risk assessors. The
impact on SoS goals must be assessed against each risk
identified, although not all risks will necessarily have an
impact on SoS level interoperability. All details should be
taken into consideration with results appropriately documented
for further evaluation. Interoperability should be considered
during identification, then within analysis to determine system
impacts on the SoS.
C. Emergent Behaviour Analysis
Based on analysis, evaluation will consider potential emer-
gent behaviour and relevant countermeasures. Some systems
may be used in different contexts due to evolutionary changes,
or the emergent behaviour of the users and systems; this may
affect the utility of the SoS as a whole. Therefore, the third
component incorporates an analysis of emergent behaviour
into the evaluation for planning of additional control measures
to bring risk to an acceptable level, and be monitored for future
feedback of emergent activity.
V. SOS CASE STUDY AND APPROACH
A. SmartPowerchair as a System of Systems
The SmartPowerchair is a standard powerchair integrated
with existing pervasive technologies consisting of different
systems, components, interactions and functions. This is sup-
ported by SmartATRS using a Smartphone system to con-
trol an Automated Transport and Retrieval System (ATRS)
[8]. ATRS is a technically advanced system using robotics
technology with Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) to
autonomously dock a powered wheelchair (Powerchair) onto
a platform lift fitted in the rear of a standard Multi-Purpose
Vehicle (MPV) system while a disabled driver is seated in the
driver’s automated Freedom seat.
SmartPowerchair integrates various system components
with the Powerchair to meet overall requirements for the SoS
as illustrated in Figure 1. For example, the GoVue application
is installed on the Smartphone to facilitate use of a rear view
camera attached to assist with manoeuvring. SmartATRS is
a key system in this SoS supporting interaction between the
MPV and the Powerchair systems. SmartATRS improves us-
ability of ATRS keyfobs and hand-held pendants by providing
a Smartphone application to control the interaction between
the MPV and Powerchair systems.
Integrated into the MPV system is a web server and relay
board interfacing between SmartATRS and ATRS components
(seat, lift and tailgate). The web server relay connects through
Ethernet to a Wi-Fi router that transmits over secure Wi-Fi
Protected Access II (WPA2) network. Smartphones or other
Wi-Fi enabled devices interact with a GUI by entering the
URL or bookmark into a browser. SmartATRS sends com-
mands wirelessly to the relay board, executed by JavaScript.
The iPortal system operates via Bluetooth, providing an alter-
native to the touchscreen interface using Powerchair joystick
interaction with the Smartphone and SmartATRS GUI, using
left or right for screen navigation and forwards for selection.
The Smartphone is the primary enabling system for control
and communication with the user through the interface, Pow-
erchair and joystick controller to receive commands. Other
technologies integrated with SmartATRS providing alternative
interaction mediums are Head Tracking and Smartglasses.
The complexity and number of interactions illustrated in
the SmartPowerchair diagram in Figure 1 re-emphasises the
importance of identifying SoS risks centred on human and
system integration, interoperability and emergent behaviour.
B. HSI, Eliciting and Modelling the SmartPowerchair SoS
Previous work from the SmartATRS project [7] [8] carried
out extensive work towards improving usability and interac-
tion. Building on this previous work, we applied the HSI
approach by gaining input, clarification and validation from
a Powerchair user. We then decomposed the SmartPowerchair
SoS using the abstraction stack approach introduced by Simp-
son and Dagli [15]. For example, starting from its highest
level, an abstraction stack of a House is composed of Rooms
that consists of floors and walls, which in turn is made up
from bricks and mortar. For SoSE, this approach can be used
to determine then model and represent individual assets and
system elements, understanding their position and relevance
in the SoS. We then re-modelled the user interaction with the
SoS, as illustrated in Figure 1. Creating this visual model was
an important step towards understanding the SoS elements and
its interconnections, providing a means of recomposing the
system’s assets into a SoS model.
Fig. 1. SmartPowerchair System of Systems Architecture
Further detail was incorporated into specific operations of
the SoS, mission goals and context, or where dependencies
and security trade-offs exist. For example, authentication to
the Smartphone was disabled due to accessibility constraints.
Additionally, one Smartphone Wi-Fi connection can be used
at a time; this means the iPortal web application controlling
SmartATRS functionality with the Powerchair joystick and
Smartphone cannot be used at the same time as the Camera
system. This results in interoperability and availability trade-
offs for both systems within the SoS.
C. HSI, Risk Identification and Analysis
Each system element was entered into CAIRIS as an
individual asset. Assets were visualised using CAIRIS asset
models illustrated by Figure 2. These models, which are
based on UML class diagrams, represent abstraction stacks
using composition associations between individual compo-
nents, systems and the Directed SoS as a whole. Based on the
“internet threat model” described in RFC 3552 [34], threats
and vulnerabilities carried out by a possible attacker role were
added and associated to each system asset while considering
their impact on security goals. Availability was considered
the primary security goal for this SoS, with Integrity of
data processed, stored or transmitted also of value. Although
Confidentiality of assets was valued, some trade-offs were
considered necessary.
Although initial findings suggested the Camera system
could be a potential attack vector, this seemed remote when
comparing the threat model for this system; with the remote
likelihood of the passive or active attacks described. For
example, a man-in-the-middle attack leading to inaccurate or
delayed video was deemed unlikely as the attacker would have
to shadow the user on-the-move in close proximity, potentially
for a long period of time. Moreover, these security issues are
unlikely to affect interoperability for the SoS as a whole.
Other threats and vulnerabilities identified the potential
of compromising the GoVue application in some way, or
accessing, transmitting, modifying and deleting GoVue image
files stored on the Smartphone. Although this feature was not
currently used, needs might arise where sensitive images could
be stored, or information about journey routes and locations
could be disclosed. This risk is likely to be minimal, but the
authentication restrictions did increase the risk of an in-person
attack, or unintentional mistake by the user or their assistant.
A version of the GoVue application may also be downloaded




































Fig. 2. CAIRIS Asset Model - Smartphone System and relations
We found that the user does not currently consider the risks
to security and interoperability of doing this.
D. HSI, Risk Analysis and Interoperability Impact
Despite the Camera system not appearing to demonstrate
significant risks or impact on interoperability, it did highlight
a specific attack vector due to consistent interactions and
dependencies on most systems of the SmartPowerchair SoS.
If the Smartphone was compromised in some way, this would
have a significant impact on security risks, availability and
interoperability at a SoS level.
It is not uncommon for Smartphones to be integrated as
a key system in IoT and SoS scenarios, despite the known
impact this might have to IoT security [35]. This may con-
tribute to the loss of SoS availability and interoperability if
the device or operating system is compromised. Privacy could
also be compromised if data theft or location tracking malware
is inadvertently installed [36].
An example from our risk assessment findings incorporating
the HSI approach, along with interoperability and emergence
analysis is shown in Figure 3. For interoperability, this specif-
ically demonstrated where the system asset was at risk of
interconnection issues with a majority of the SoS, thus losing
the ability to control it.
E. HSI and Evaluation of Emergent Behaviour
SoS interconnections and controls may uncover unexpected
emergent behaviour, the consequences of which could increase
risk if the SoS mission and security goals are not met.
HSI considerations were therefore employed when applying
controls and measures to reduce issues arising from emergent
behaviour. Emergent behaviour was, however, harder to an-
ticipate due to its unknown and uncertain nature. Feedback
included in the evaluation considered a previous operating
system update offering enhancements to its security and func-
tionality, but this no longer supported voice interaction func-
tions previously used and tested. We consider other updates
by the operating system or application providers outside the
SoS boundary, so these may have unexpected consequences.
VI. DISCUSSION
To assist with SoS risk assessment of security in the Smart-
Powerchair, our approach introduced relevant SoS components
addressing HSI, interoperability and emergent behaviour that
may inform requirements engineering for operational needs.
HSI was important towards understanding security concerns
of human interaction, and interoperability analysis was found
to be significant when determining the overall risk impact
level. This approach can be used in requirements engineering
through to operations when used with existing repeatable risk
approaches. Risk assessment must, however, be based upon
informed knowledge of the SoS context, constituent systems
and components to ensure key stakeholders, user and system
interactions are considered throughout the process.
A. Applying HSI with CAIRIS
Modelling the SoS first using abstraction stacks to de-
compose the elements of the SoS helped develop a visual
representation of the system structure, interconnections and
user interaction within the SoS shown in Figure 1. Each of the
systems and components were modelled in CAIRIS as assets
associated with other relevant system assets composing the
SoS. The asset models illustrated in Figure 2 were useful for
reviewing and visualising assets and their relations with stake-
holders. This indicated how they could be subsequently linked
to threats, modelling the related risks specific to the human
and system interactions. The asset models were also useful
when validating the decomposed elements with stakeholders,
as the models helped identify missing systems, components or
interrelations.
CAIRIS offered useful tool support for modelling and
visualising a Directed SoS with parent-child relationships. It
was, however, unclear how this clarity might be achieved with
other types of SoS given their differences and reduction in cen-
tralised access and control. Additionally, CAIRIS was useful
for visualising the SoS assets and modelling its risks. However,
CAIRIS does not incorporate any means for evaluating the
SoS level impact on interoperability or emergence. Therefore,
the assessment reverted to a commonly used spreadsheet for
documenting the steps taken. Further analysis and application
to case studies in other domains will be useful for validating
the effectiveness of CAIRIS as tool support for eliciting and
modelling a range of SoSs.
Fig. 3. Risk Overview with Interoperability and Emergence analysis
B. Interoperability Analysis
Interoperability impact at SoS level was considered against
each potential risk, as demonstrated in Figure 3, providing
further consideration towards dependencies and required con-
trol measures. For example, if the camera system was no
longer interoperable, the SoS would continue to function.
However, if the Smartphone system cannot communicate with
other constituent systems, the entire SoS ceases to function.
Therefore, understanding the impact on interoperability could
be critical to achieving its SoS goals.
One option of incorporating interoperability is considering
the role of other system models to review its impact. For
example, Faily & Fle´chais [37] illustrate how Goal-oriented
Requirement Language (GRL) models were generated from
other models in CAIRIS. The GRL models then identified
insights that had previously been missed. GRL could be
equally effective when considering interoperability in SoSs to
examine the impact of changing system assets, goals, or user
processes.
C. Controls and Emergent Behaviour
In a more general context, controls may include data loss
prevention and remote wiping tools, certainly where physical
theft of the device is a potential risk. Policy, process and
security awareness towards permitted usage are other tools
that may be incorporated.
However, in our case study example, the SoS is managed
and controlled by a single IoT user, which highlights a need to
consider security for the user at design stage. This also raises
the challenge of introducing basic steps and security awareness
for IoT users, particularly when the interoperability of the
smartphone becomes a critical element of the SoS success or
failure. Suitable control measures and mitigations also need to
consider possible outcomes of steps taken for SoS resilience
given the emergent behaviour associated with identified risks.
Identifying or predicting emergent behaviour was chal-
lenged by the unknown effect of coupling systems into a
SoS for a new purpose. However, this should be an ongoing
exercise benefiting from performance monitoring and feedback
of current and previous behaviour, which in this scenario,
helped identify possible emergence and control measures.
In the example described in Figure 3, reviewing future
operating system or application updates may be considered.
However, updates from third-parties beyond SoS control may
be required to ultimately improve system performance and se-
curity. This means trade-offs may exist to maintain safety and
security in the SoS. Interoperability and emergent behaviour
is, however, relatively complex, and requires further analysis
and application to other case study domains to understand
challenges posed by different SoS types.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented three components for SoS risk
assessment incorporating HSI, interoperability impact analy-
sis, and emergent behaviour evaluation with control measures.
We introduced abstraction stacks as a means of decomposing
systems, and used CAIRIS for initial risk modelling of se-
curity and socio-technical aspects of the SoS. Although the
proposed components represent preliminary work, evaluating
them provided a holistic view of the SoS from which threat-
sources and vulnerabilities to security could be identified. This
demonstrated the potential for identifying unacceptable human
interactions, interoperability issues and emergent behaviour,
thereby allowing appropriate measures to be adopted. This
can improve the security and safety of people with reduced
physical abilities interacting with assistive technologies.
Future work will conduct further analysis with the Smart-
Powerchair and other case study domains using CAIRIS for
eliciting and modelling a range of SoSs. This aims to identify
gaps and opportunities for SoS risk assessment and security.
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